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ON THE ECONOMIC PREMISES OF THE 
"RESTRUCTURING" BY LIQUIDATION1  
 
 
Some consideration over the economic fundamentals of the liquidation 
of state-own companies into the restructuring process of Romanian 









Abstract: At the ends of 1990’s under the pressure of the international financial institutions, 
Romania agreed to close some state-owned firms with significant and durable loses and limited 
perspectives. In this context, the present paper intends to offer an economic analysis of the main 
issues regarding the liquidation of state-owned companies. We discus on: the impact on 
macroeconomic results, on aggregate production, as well as on other industries production and 
supply; consequences on market competition; the influence of financial result of the firm on others, 
on its economic environment; economic perspectives of the unit and its market; effects and efforts 
for state budget and the alternative of privatization at any price. 
 
                                                 
1 A first version of this material was published under the title Restructuring by Liquidation: a 
solution? (Restructurarea prin lichidare: o solutie?) in Tribuna Economica no.24/1999, pp.16-17. 
A slightly different version (a revisited one and with some added content) was presented at the 
International Symposium: Development and Integration in the conditions of transition (Cluj-
Napoca, Babes-Bolyai University, 2003). The present English version of the paper integrates both 
materials and we also made several (but not essential) completions and minor modifications.  
Changes operated to the initial text are marked here in blue. 
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The liquidation of certain entities is undoubtedly a necessity and a 
characteristic of any economic system, not only of one in "transition". It represents 
an essential component of the functioning mechanism of the market economy, 
mechanism based on the principles of economic rationality. The problem that 
arises is who sets and on what criteria, which entities are need to be liquidated? 
Under normal circumstances, those of a market economy that effectively (and 
efficiently) function this problem is solved "naturally" by the very way its inner 
mechanisms operate in a well-established legislative framework. However, the 
Romanian transition was (and still is) far from such a solution, and that leaves, on 
the one hand, the decision into the account of the state-owner and, on the other 
hand, imposes its presence in this process. 
The right of each and every owner to dispose of how he wants to its property 
is incontestable. Under the conditions of Romania, the state - as owner - is the one 
that ultimately has the decisive word on state property. From this view, the SPF2, 
as the general administrator of this property, has the legal abilities necessary to 
initiate and enforce such measures.  
 
 Economic premises applied to Romanian conditions 
The way in which this process has been carried out so far has been lacking a 
real and substantive analysis of decisions and has been chaotic and inconsistent. 
We believe that it is necessary, at least from now on, for a discussion to take place 
serious about the objective criteria on the basis of which one firm or another is 
"condemned" to extinction, as well as to the aims pursued. Considering past 
experiences related to reorganization and/or liquidation, it is necessary to pay 
attention at least to the following aspects: 
1. The assertion - commonly seen lately in the expositions of opinions on 
this subject - according to which the closure of certain enterprises would lead to 
the increase of the Gross Domestic Product [GDP] as a result of elimination of the 
so-called "negative value added" cause by them requires a more detailed analysis. 
If such a relation is essentially undeniable, what is required is that attention 
should not be directed to gross added value but on net added value. And, 
consequently, not on what happens to GDP but with NDP [Net Domestic Product]. 
The differences regard the consumption of fixed capital, and its recovery in fully 
can be sacrificed, at least over a certain time horizon, to the extent that a particular 
firm achieves positive net positive value. Even in the context of a certain decrease 
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in GDP (estimated for the firms with the highest losses up to 0.5% from GDP3 in 
the most critical year, still a tolerable figure) and accumulation of losses. 
This solution is based on the mechanism - well-known to any economist - of 
determined the "breakdown point" of firms in short run, as it appears in the 
economic literature. In a simplified and partially adapted form, it implies that a 
firm can continue its activity even it registering losses, if by selling its 
production fully recovers material and personnel costs, less the amortization 
(depreciation) of fixed capital and, at the same time, can do pay all its due 
obligations (loans, suppliers, employees, taxes). The activity may continue under 
the described conditions at least as long as replacing fixed capital items (e.g. 
machineries, equipment) due to physical and/or moral depreciation is not a 
stringent necessity. 
2. The effects of shutdown a business cannot be "retained" within 
an industry/market; so the analysis of the opportunity of such a decision must 
be a global one. The closure of a firm can generate chain reactions of equilibrium 
changes on its market as well as in other markets. 
Obviously, the price for goods may rise on that market (with a high 
probability considering the markets structure in the majority of the industries 
subject of the present restructuring) as a direct result of the overall supply 
restrains. In the situations in which this decrease in production are "compensated" 
(in fully or partially) by additional imports and / or by other domestic producers, 
we will see, in the first case, an accentuating in the deficit of the Balance of Trade 
and of the Balance of Payments, and, in the second case, an increasing in the 
concentration (monopolization) level on the market, with expected effects over 
competition and again on prices. At the same time, each firm is, on the one hand, a 
supplier and, on the other hand, a customer of other firms and, as a result, its 
disappearance can cause problems to all the firms with which it is in business 
relations. And, whatever it is said, the shutdown of a company will result in 
a reduction in revenues in the economy, in aggregate demand and 
production. Here we mainly (but not exclusively) look at what is happening in 
the area of households' demand. 
Therefore, the consequences may be more complex than those estimated at 
first glance, and the negative impact may be greater than the eliminated losses. 
3. Level of the traditional indicators of microeconomic results 
(profit and losses) should not be in such cases the main decision 
criterion. In many circumstances they fail to disclose the economic reality of a 
firm. The existence of losses is not - as I have shown - necessarily a problem, at 
least if they do not exceed a certain level (that of the consumption of fixed capital) 
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first 50 firms with largest losses. 
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and especially if they have a trend to elimination (reduction). The company's 
perspectives appear to be the most important element to be analyzed in the context. 
The present situation and estimated evolution of outputs and resources markets as 
well as the general economic conditions are essential items to be appreciated. And 
this because some losses may be result of an economic conjuncture, others may not 
be imputable to the firm, and sometimes they are the result of state interference in 
the economy (see, for example, the procedure and the consequences of the subsidy' 
mechanism in the case of pork and chicken production). In the same time, there 
may be and there are firms that do not currently record losses or have very low 
losses, but the analysis for the next period indicates that those will significantly 
increase. 
4. The problem of indebtedness, the level and, in particular, the possibilities 
and the modalities of repayment should rather be taken into consideration, as well 
as the way of payment of firm's obligations in general. The non-payment of 
taxes and of utilities and other supplies (e.g. electricity and heating, natural gas) 
delivered by state-owned companies has become a common practice in the 
"management" of companies. And this practice is now the main cause for the 
financial jam, of the payment crises. As result, the situation of outstanding 
payments and the contribution of each unit to the financial lock-up 
must be the fundamental "indicators" of deciding the "destiny" of each economic 
unit. Selecting the companies that will be closed based on this criterion will lead, if 
not necessarily and automatically to reducing the payments problems in the 
economy and to a financial "unblock" (partial), certainly will stops accentuating it. 
The initiative of starting a reorganization or liquidation (bankruptcy) proceeding 
it must not necessarily belong in such cases to the state or SPF, but directly of 
interested parts (the largest creditors). 
5. From a budgetary outlook, what should prevail is the effort-effect 
ratio of each and every closed firm on the state budget (a cost-benefit 
approach). And this should represent, plus the (mentioned above) contribution 
to financial transfer lock (in chain), the decisional criterion. Closing a business 
generally means a minus in revenues for the state budget. We do not refer 
here to the profits that we assume to be inexistent (this is the motivation of the 
decision), but to the value added tax for the products produced, the taxes on wages 
and the social security contributions and other funds. On the other hand, it will be 
an increasing in the state expenditures, materialized at least in the 
unemployment benefits to be paid and in this economic aberration represented by 
"compensatory" payments. Making here a necessary specification, we must explain 
that our previous affirmation does not consider compensatory salaries to be 
aberration in itself, but their level. A level so high in many cases, that such 
payments became an goal for employees as well as for management, and so their 
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interest was perverted from the improving the economic activity of the firm to an 
opposite direction of increasing losses. It is more appropriate - as proved by 
practice too - that at least some of these amounts to be oriented towards 
investment (or to stimulate the investments) generating new jobs. Otherwise, we 
will only replace a problem (loss-making firms) with another (unemployment) and, 
moreover, we can create at least a "new"4  problem: inflation. 
Returning to the budget and budgetary approach, we appreciate that only if 
the state revenues (respectively the future estimated revenues) from these units, 
plus those supplementary expenses as well as the costs of actual liquidation (e.g. 
preservation of the physical objectives) do not exceed the value of the losses (plus, 
if appropriate, any state subsidies and estimated net amounts to be recovered 
following liquidation), only then the decision of closing a firm really gets an 
economic foundation. 
6. Finally, if the declared purpose of restructuring is to increase the 
efficiency and to eliminate the losses, then the selling price of the firms (in 
privatization process as a pre-liquidation step) should not be the element of 
interest for the state but the business plan, investments level and commercial 
contribution. And only if there are no buyers, liquidation becomes a solution. 
Taking over debts to the budget, refunding a portion of the price for paying 
these debts or investments is a false issue. They have no essential consequences on 
privatization. The buyer will be willing most likely to offer a higher price if he 
knows that part of it will be returned to him or if he has will received a debt 
reduction in any form (or any other benefits). Or a correspondingly lower price if 
he takes over the company with all its "unresolved issues". So, it is reasonable to 
presume that there are not significant differences in the net value of budgetary 
income from privatization between any of these ways. Moreover, differences can 
therefore only arise in relation to the price level offered, and if the price is not 
important, then such measures are of no relevance. This is because the purchasing 
decision is normally based mainly on the company's perspective and only 
indirectly on its financial situation at some point. 
 
 Final Considerations 
 The purpose of the above is neither to argue for the artificial maintenance in 
operation of certain state companies for unlimited period nor to challenge the 
validity and the necessity of liquidation as a form of restructuring the economy. 
We just wanted to present some "milestones" according to which the entire process 
should be thought, design and developed. The final goal should be - in our opinion 
- both economic (eliminating the so called "economic black holes" with the lowest 
possible costs and without affect the prospect of economic development; increase 
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 Inflation was already a major problem in Romania in the 1990s. 
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efficiency and, why not, ensure higher incomes for the state) and social (the need 
to maintain a certain level of employment, tolerable social costs, the least possible 
negative impact on the population). What is required is a complex analysis of all 
the estimated consequences and, in particular, a case-by-case analysis. The 
necessary tools exists, we just need to use it. 
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